Attempt to Subdivide Component Assets Identified by Cost Segregation Study Deemed “Immaterial”
A number of our clients have expressed concern about a recent tax court case where the court disallowed reclassification of assets identified by a cost segregation study. After careful review, we concluded that the decision is a narrow one and will likely not apply beyond the facts in this case. We believe that the decision will not readily apply to all purchase price allocations.
In Peco Foods, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent ( T.C. Memo 2012-18) the tax court upheld the decision of the Internal Revenue Service precluding Peco Foods from modifying purchase price allocations of two processing plants it purchased in 1995 and 1998. The court upheld the terms of the respective asset purchase agreements, which the buyer and seller had agreed to at the time of the purchases.
The purchase agreements contained provisions in both allocation schedules stating that “the parties would use these values for all purposes including tax and financial reporting,” making the contracts binding unless Peco could prove they were unenforceable. The court determined that Peco’s decision to allocate the purchase price among machinery, equipment, and furniture showed that it was aware of the specific component assets but chose not to allocate additional purchase price to those assets. Therefore the court determined that Peco intended the asset described as “Processing Plant Building” to be treated as a single asset.
The court also found that Peco believed the term “Processing Plant Building” was ambiguous only after it perceived a benefit could be realized by subdividing the building into component assets. Therefore, the court ruled that there was no ambiguity in the term.
Peco agreed to allocate the purchase price of the plant among three assets: Real Property: Land, Real Property: Improvements,” and “Machinery, Equipment, Furnitures and Fixtures.”
The court determined that the decision to allocate the purchase price separately among these various assets showed that Peco was aware of the existence of subcomponent assets but chose not to allocate additional purchase price to them. The court also determined that had Peco intended to allocate purchase price to subcomponent assets, it would have done so by allocating additional purchase price to the asset described as “Machinery, Equipment, Furnitures and Fixtures.”
In addition, the appraisal for the second plant was dated prior to the date on which Peco entered into the agreement, suggesting that Peco could have adopted a more detailed allocation schedule into the agreement but chose not to.
The second agreement contained a merger clause providing that the contract, accompanying exhibits, and closing documents “constitute the entire agreement between the Parties.” The court determined that this clause creates a presumption that the writing represents a “final and complete agreement of the parties.”
The court never reached the issue of cost segregation when it ruled that the agreements were not ambiguous and that whether the acquired assets may be subdivided into component assets was immaterial because Peco may not deviate from its characterization of those assets as stated in the original allocation schedules.
Because Peco Foods attached a statement to Form 8594 allocating specific amounts of the Purchase Price to Processing Plant Buildings and Real Property Improvements, they cast the allocations in stone. The tax court found that the agreements were enforceable, the terms were unambiguous, and all relevant assets were covered. Peco claimed that it could reallocate the useful lives of assets under Code Sec. 338(b)(5), the “residual method,” which applies when the parties do not agree in writing as to the allocation of any part of the consideration. However, since all assets were covered by the agreements, and the agreements were enforceable, the residual method did not apply.
Because the original documents went into the level of detail of identification they are bound to stay within those allocations. In our experience, agreements containing such specificity are rare. Therefore, we don’t expect any significant impact from this ruling nor do we anticipate an appeal.